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Background: In the March 1988 elections for members of the National Assembly, governorships and
municipal offices, about half of El Salvador's estimated 1.7 million eligible voters did not go to the
polls. More than 150,000 of those who did cast null or blank ballots. The presidential elections are
scheduled for March 1989. Of the 60 seats in the unicameral National Assembly, 31 are controlled
by ARENA, 23 by the Christian Democrats, and six by the National Conciliation Party (PCN).
ARENA won 30 seats in the March 1988 elections. Shortly thereafter, one of the PCN legislators
"defected" to ARENA. Under the Salvadoran constitution, the president must receive an absolute
majority of all votes cast. If in the first balloting, no candidate receives a majority of ballots, a runoff is then scheduled between the two candidates receiving the largest number of votes. In the
first round of voting, the rightwing ARENA is considered likely to receive the largest share of the
vote, but not a majority. In September former Col. Sigifredo Ochoa, an ARENA leader, said his
party faction will have recourse to actions by death squads if the US attempts to manipulate the
presidential elections in favor of the Christian Democrat Party. Salvadoran rightwingers have
reportedly accused the CIA of various manipulations to secure the victory of Fidel Chavez Mena in
March 1989. The CIA, they say, was active in Duarte's 1984 election campaign. ARENA candidates:
In early October, the Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) announced Alfredo Cristiani (party
president) and Armando Calderon (elected mayor of San Salvador in March) as its presidential
and vice presidential candidates, respectively. Calderon refused the nomination on the ground
that the constitution prohibits persons holding public positions from running in elections, and
for "political reasons." The local media reported that Calderon's nomination was put forth by
ARENA in an attempt to change its public image, i.e., from unsavory links to death squads, to one
of efficiency and political "moderation." Cristiani dismissed Calderon's "constitutional" ground
for refusing the nomination, stating that it would not be illegal for him to continue performing his
duties as mayor during the campaign. However, Cristiani held fast, and ARENA chose another
vice presidential candidate, Francisco Jose Merino. Christian Democrats: On Oct. 10, the split in
the Christian Democrat party became official when one faction filed with the Central Elections
Council as a separate entity. Last summer, rival factions nominated their own candidates to
run in the presidential election. The two factions' candidates are Fidel Chavez Mena, attorney
and former cabinet minister, and Julio Adolfo Rey Prendes, also a former cabinet minister. Rey
Prendes' faction filed with the Elections Council to establish the Authentic Christian Movement
(MAC). MAC also incorporated a tiny rightist party. Democratic Convergence: (See article above
on Convergence for discussion of candidates.) In response to statements by government officials
that the Convergence is likely to establish an alliance with the Christian Democrats to prevent a
victory by ARENA, Zamora has said the coalition will not lend its support to either of the candidates
in the run-off. The Christian Democrats estimate that the CD could obtain about 300,000 votes
in the March elections. Discussion: The Christian Democrat party, the US Embassy and some
military officers point to the participation of the Convergence in the electoral process as evidence
that the democratic project pushed by Washington via Duarte is bearing fruit. Meanwhile, FDR
leaders are being pressured to break off their alliance with the FMLN. According to Zamora, such
pressures are the greatest insurance that the alliance will continue, "because if we do that, everyone
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will believe we did so under pressure by the gringos." For its part, the FMLN has accepted the
CD's decision to participate in the elections, but has also decided to continue actions dedicated
to destabilizing the regime. The rebels, moreover, do not plan to urge their supporters to vote
for the Convergence. According to FMLN commandante Nidia Diaz: "There are people who still
believe that elections can be a solution, and for them the Democratic Convergence could be an
option. But our supporters have a more sophisticated consciousness and therefore know that
in this way we will not find a solution to the conflict." Chavez Mena is not considered a strong
candidate, or capable of carrying sufficient votes to easily defeat an ARENA candidate in a runoff. In comparison to Duarte, he is perceived as less charismatic and lacking in political influence,
both within the Christian Democrat party and elsewhere. The US Embassy reportedly considers
Chavez Mena relatively untainted in terms of the corruption which permeates the party hierarchy.
He is described as sober and efficient. For the Embassy, Rey Prendes, long-time political wheelerdealer, is considered too "close" to the persons involved in the most egregious cases of corruption
during the Duarte government. On the other hand, Rey Prendes has a reputation for compromise,
i.e., skill at striking deals with adversaries. Apparently, Chavez Mena does not enjoy this type
of reputation. Some observers attribute the division of the Christian Democrat party to the US
government's decision to transform Chavez Mena into a candidate. Both the left and the right in
El Salvador describe the Christian Democrats' "reform project" of the last four years as a failure,
albeit for different reasons. The FMLN's assessment of the political situation turns in part on the
virtual impossibility of seeing Chavez Mena revitalize the Christian Democrat reform project.
Rebel leaders point to the National Assembly controlled by ARENA, and the intensified socioeconomic crisis. The US role in El Salvador receives good marks from few quarters. The left in
general considers the US to be a principal cause of the myriad crises afflicting the country. Many
rightist politicians and many influential military officers accuse the US of meddling in Salvadoran
politics, and thus, preventing them from decimating the rebel movement. In their view, limitations
on military activities and strategies in the interest of at least creating the image of human rights
observance have strengthened the FMLN and its "sympathizers." (Basic data from back issues of
CAU)
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